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Abstract 
This paper surveys the recent literature on voluntary (or negotiated) approaches 
as an environmental policy tool. Rather than adopting a positive perspective and 
describing different types of voluntary approaches (VAs) and their main 
features or their pros and cons, this survey focuses on the economic incentives 
for firms or industries to adopt VAs. The consequent role that VAs may play 
within a set of policy tools designed to address environmental problems is then 
assessed. A careful understanding of the economic incentives that induce a firm 
to sign a VA is indeed crucial to identify and design the policy mix that makes 
the VA both environmentally effective and economically efficient. 
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1. Introduction 
Voluntary approaches (henceforth VAs) are nowadays considered as one 
of the most important policy instruments to reach environmental targets. 
Following their increased use in addressing domestic and international 
environmental issues, several authors have analysed their main pros and cons.1 
On the one hand, it has been highlighted that there are  advantages in terms of 
increased flexibility for polluters and regulators in facing specific problems , and 
that VAs potentially foster environmental innovation and the sharing of 
information on cleaner technologies. On the other hand, concerns about their 
real effectiveness and problems of regulatory capture have been repeatedly 
expressed. 
At an institutional level, the use and the official recognition of these policy 
instruments has  continued to grow. For instance, in the recent adoption of the 
Action Plan “Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory Environment” (CEC, 
2002a) by the European Union it has been stressed the role of regulatory 
practices explicitly referred to as coregulation, self-regulation and voluntary sectoral 
agreements, terms which are now familiar to academics and policymakers who  
deal with VAs in environmental policy. In the light of the adoption of this 
Action Plan, the EC has issued a new Communication on “Environmental 
Agreements at Community Level Within the Framework of the Action Plan on 
the Simplification and Improvement of the Regulatory Environment” (CEC, 
2002b) which complements the well known 1996 Communication (CEC, 1996). 
In order to better define the subject of this survey, let us start by 
presenting the most widely used definitions of VAs. By the term ‘voluntary 
approaches’ we refer to “commitments from polluting firms or industrial 
sectors to improve their environmental performance” (Lévêque, 1997). 
According to terminology which is gaining increasing consensus (e.g., OECD, 
1999; Lyon and Maxwell, 2001), VAs can be placed into three main categories, 
which can be ordered as a function of the public sector’s degree of 
participation.  
The first category is that of unilateral commitments, which consist of 
environmental improvement programmes established by firms themselves and 
communicated to their stakeholders. The public sector in this case does not 
participate in the design of the environmental initiative. The term ‘self-
regulation’ basically refers to this kind of VA. 
The second category is that of negotiated agreements, which are contracts 
between the public (national, federal or regional) authorities and  industry. The 
role of the former may be either a leading or a secondary one, but usually 
implies the undertaking of specific commitments (e.g. provision of technical or 
financial assistance, giving up the use or the threat to use command and control 
and/or economic instruments, granting the polluter flexibility in other 
activities).  
                                                 
1 See the surveys by Lyon and Maxwell (2001), Khanna (2001), Alberini and Segerson (2002) and the 
books edited by Carraro and Lévêque (1999) and Baranzini and Thalman (2004). 
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The third category is that of public voluntary schemes, in which firms that sign 
the VA agree to standardised rules developed by the public authorities. EPA 
schemes, such as Energy Star and Green Lights, or initiatives by the European 
Union, such as the Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS) and the 
European Ecolabel, are examples of this third category.2 
This survey, rather than distinguishing between the three aforesaid types 
of VAs, takes a different approach. We argue that what actually matters is not 
the degree of involvement by the public sector, but the economic incentives to 
adopt a VA that addresses a specific environmental problem. Therefore, this 
paper will identify conditions under which a VA is most likely to be adopted, 
and will illustrate instances where they can become a strategic tool in the hands 
of firms.  
This ‘firm’s viewpoint’ is perhaps a major simplification of the existing 
categorizations of VAs and the related incentives to adopt them. In the next 
section, we argue that we can simply distinguish between demand-side or supply-
side incentives to adopt VAs. This distinction helps us to better focus on the 
following two main objectives: a) to identify which economic factors actually 
favour the adoption of VAs and affect their environmental effectiveness and 
economic efficiency; b) to derive some policy conclusions that may help 
analysts and policymakers to assess the economic trade-offs associated with the 
use of VAs.  
The theoretical framework employed in this paper is centred on imperfect 
competition and oligopoly theory. There are at least two main reasons which 
explain this choice. The first one is theoretical and is closely linked with the 
aforementioned goals. As is well-known, the empirical evidence about the 
participation of firms and environmental effectiveness is mixed, with some 
firms participating in VAs, while others do not, and with cases of VAs 
recognised as a public success and others in which firms remain committed to 
their business as usual targets. The oligopoly framework is therefore crucial if 
we are to account for such heterogeneity. The second reason has to do with the 
very nature of VAs, which can be seen as a specific policy instrument lying 
somewhere between direct regulation and economic instruments. From such a 
policy perspective, the use of VAs, either vis-à-vis or in combination with other 
environmental policy instruments, can be justified in several cases. The 
common denominator in these cases  is the presence of inefficiency, market 
failures and strategic behaviour, which are all strictly related to imperfect 
competition in the product market, and can therefore be effectively captured by 
an oligopolistic theoretical framework.   
A case in point is when environmental protection is to be achieved 
through technological innovation, because in such cases standards, 
environmental taxes or emission permits are a sub-optimal instrument for 
                                                 
2 The OECD (2003) survey of VAs actually implemented in OECD countries partially amends the 
above terminology, and also considers a fourth category, ie. private contracts between polluters and 
polluted. We will not deal with this Coasean solutions in this survey. 
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achieving adequate levels of technological innovation.3 Therefore, there is room 
for the adoption of VAs or at least of a policy mix to which VAs belong. 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section illustrates how the 
economic analysis of VAs can be classified according to demand-side and 
supply-side adoption incentives. Then section three focuses on demand side 
incentives and distinguishes between cases in which VAs are mainly aimed at 
enhancing the environmental reputation of a firm’s product, and those where 
the polluter’s action is fundamentally motivated by the competitive advantages 
accruing from product differentiation. Supply-side effects are analysed in 
section 4. The traditional view that VAs  are a strategy for pre-empting 
regulatory threats belong to the supply side incentives discussed in section 4. 
However, this section also includes  an economic analysis of  participation 
incentives that cannot be  described as being a regulator’s ‘sticks’, but that still 
affect company’s and market supply, whether in the form of public incentives, 
savings on the cost side, or competitive advantages arising from voluntary over-
compliance. A final section highlights the policy implications of this survey. 
2. Strategic incentives for voluntary over-compliance. 
Let us focus on the motives behind a firm’s decision to adopt a VA. The 
OECD (1999) report distinguishes between ‘regulatory gains’ motives, which 
may be in the form of a lower pollution abatement level or lower complying 
costs; ‘saving inputs’ derived from the managerial and technical expertise which 
firms acquire thanks to the voluntary scheme; and ‘increasing sales’ or 
‘enhancing reputation’ motives, which are related to the exploitation of 
consumers’ ‘green preferences’ (the so-called green consumerism phenomenon), 
of investors’ strategies rewarding firms with good environmental performances, 
and of stakeholders’ green attitudes that determine the social environment in 
which the firm operates. The same motives are basically indicated by Lyon and 
Maxwell (2001), who distinguish between ‘improving of corporate productivity’, 
‘responses to green consumers and investors’, ‘shaping of regulatory decision’ 
(pre-emption’ and ‘weakening’ of forthcoming regulations, or even induction of 
regulation, if the firm wants to exploit its environmental performance to raise 
costs incurred by rivals). As an additional category of incentives to adopt VAs, 
Khanna (2001) points to the cases of technical assistance or financial incentives 
which often come with the signing of a VA. With a partially different 
perspective, Alberini and Segerson (2002) distinguish between “market based” 
incentives (in the form of exploitation of green preferences for a firm’s 
products or stocks), ‘government-created incentives’ (whether positive ones like 
financial and technical incentives, or negative ones such as the threat to impose 
a command and control or tax solution to the environmental problem), ‘free-
riding incentives’ (which may induce a group of firms to sign an agreement in 
order to be certain that an industry target is met), and ‘targeting incentives’ 
(when, through a VA, regulators are able to induce a voluntary environmental 
                                                 
3 See Carraro and Siniscalco (1994), or Carraro, Lanza and Tudini (1994). 
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effort from firms whose environmental performance could not have been 
regulated otherwise). Finally, other authors consider incentives that cannot be 
directly incorporated into the previous categories. These include ‘shared 
uncertainty’ (Glachant, 1999), ‘innovation effects’ (Aggeri, 1999; Carraro and 
Siniscalco, 1994), and market structure or competitive advantages (Denicolò, 
2000; Videras, 2001).  
Instead of the using previous ‘structural interpretations’ of the main 
incentives to voluntary participation  to review and orientate  our theoretical 
and empirical research, this paper proposes a ‘reduced form’ interpretation of 
why profit maximising firms may decide to sign VAs. Our ( basic, but useful) 
statement is as follows. 
A firm adopts a VA only if it raises its profits. If a VA enables a firm to raise its 
profits, then the VA must have an effect on the demand or supply schedule, whether at the 
firm or market level. 
Thus, we argue that all the aforementioned explanations for the adoption 
of VAs can be modelled as a demand and/or supply effect. Figure 1 provides a 
representation of our statement: the adoption of a VA (i.e. a shift of the firm 
equilibrium from E to EVA) is accompanied by a shift in either the demand or 
supply curve, or both. For example, a self-regulation initiative recognized by 
consumers is likely to determine an outward demand shift (Figure 1a). 
Conversely, if such initiative enhances the stock market performance is 
registered (e.g. Konar and Cohen, 2001), then a shift in the supply curve must 
occur, due to the reduced cost of the capital input (Figure 1b). Similarly, a VA 
undertaken by a subgroup of firms in an industry which pre-empts costlier 
forms of direct regulation (e.g. as in Dawson and Segerson, 2000) will essentially 
have a positive effect on the supply function of the firms in the industry.4 
Finally, both demand and supply effects occur in models where a VA affects the 
regulator’s choices in a vertically differentiated market with regard to the 
environmental characteristics of firms’ products (Lutz-Lyon-Maxwell, 2000). 
In the next sections, the distinction between demand and supply effects 
that may induce a firm to adopt a VA will be used to provide a different 
interpretation of the existing literature on VAs and to provide an assessment of 
VAs as environmental policy instruments. From this latter viewpoint, VAs 
provide environmental benefits with which other social costs and benefits can 
be associated. The former are usually measured in terms of reduced consumer 
surplus and lower company profits, while the latter may consist, for example, of 
reduced public costs (be they monitoring or transaction costs), diminished 
implementation time or greater understanding of environmental policies. In 
particular, it is crucial to check whether the adoption of VAs actually maximises 
social welfare vis à vis other environmental policy tools. The identification of 
firms’ strategic incentives to undertake a VA represents the analytical base from 
                                                 
4 In this case, there still is an effect at the firm level, although as a by-product of participation and 
emission abatement decisions taken by a collection of agents. These situations are sometimes called 
‘collective environmental agreements’ (Millock and Salanié, 2000) or ‘coalitional VAs’ (Brau, Carraro 
and Golfetto, 2001). See also Dixit and Olson (2000). 
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which to assess social benefits and costs, and  also possible trade-offs between 
different government objectives.  
3. Voluntary approaches driven by demand effects 
VAs where the demand effect is predominant represent a quite 
homogeneous category. In these models, the participation motive is the 
‘capture’ of consumers’ willingness to pay for the environmental attributes of a 
firm’s product, i.e. VAs become a product enhancing and/or a differentiation 
strategy that helps create niche markets, and/or identify a firm’s product. 
Notice that this explanation is only valid in conditions of imperfect 
competition, where firms can affect the industry demand schedule, and that a 
basic assumption is that in their demand for goods or services consumers 
associate an additional value for environment-friendly products or processes. 
Some empirical evidence to support  this assumption has been provided,5 
although not all authors consider it as conclusive (Cf. Alberini and Segerson, 
2002) and the common belief is that the extent of these effects is limited. By 
way of indirect support, Arora and Cason (1995, 1996), Khanna and Damon 
(1999) and Videras and Alberini (2000) note a higher than average likelihood of 
participation in EPA voluntary programs (namely “33/50”, Green Lights and 
WasteWise) by firms producing final goods, whereas Arora and Gangopadhyay 
(1995) refer to a survey by a British product-development consultancy agency in 
1989, which revealed that 53% of people questioned had declined to buy a 
product because worried about the effects of the product or its packaging on 
the environment.  
VAs driven by demand motives may take the form of unilateral 
commitments (often supported by an advertising and publicity campaign) or of 
public voluntary schemes. An example of the latter category is the European 
Union Ecolabel.  
In principle, a firm’s environmental performance may affect its own and 
market demand curve by means of three main effects: 
a) a demand upward shift; 
b) a higher slope of the demand due to a change in consumers’ awareness 
of environmental issues; 
c) a higher slope of the demand due to product differentiation. 
The first effect is a quite straightforward one. If consumers value a clean 
environment in their utility function, they are ready to pay a higher price for 
non-polluting products produced using a more environment-friendly 
technology. Hence, as shown in figure 2, market demand shifts upward when a 
‘cleaning up’ activity is carried out. From a normative viewpoint, this kind of 
effect is welfare improving. On the one hand, if an incentive exists for firms to 
voluntarily carry out emission abatement policies that can be framed within a 
VA, this must be in the form of a profit increase. On the other hand, 
                                                 
5 See Khanna (2001) for a summary of these studies. 
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consumers are also generally better-off if they can enjoy the better environment 
that they are ready to pay for.  
However, as shown by Carraro and Soubeyran (1996) and Garvie (1999), 
if consumers care (care more) about the environment, the demand curve is also 
steeper for any output level (see figure 2). Intuitively, the presence (the increase) 
of ‘green consumerism’, makes the other characteristics of a good (the others 
which determine total utility) relatively less important. Considered alone 
(without any demand shift), this reduced demand elasticity usually entails a 
profit loss for the firm, although accompanied by an increase in its market 
power. However, if there is a voluntary abatement initiative, more widespread 
consumer information would lead first of all, to an increase in demand. Hence, 
in equilibrium, profits may well increase. As for welfare effects, the sign is not a 
priori determined, given that a trade-off arises between firms’ profits and higher 
prices which may reduce the consumers’ surplus.  
Finally, firms can also try to increase profits by differentiating their 
product or process from those of the other firms in the industry. This is the 
third effect, which differs from the others inasmuch as it is a relative effect that 
benefits only a subgroup of firms. In this case, consumer’s surplus may not be 
reduced, and profits and environmental benefits are usually increased.  
Are these effects VA specific? As for demand upward shifts, they also 
seem to occur when a firm improves its environmental performance because of 
the imposition of a standard or a tax. Therefore, they cannot be considered as 
VA specific. Conversely, the two increased demand slope effects are more 
related to a firm ‘free’ decision: a) when there is an increase in consumer 
awareness, VAs may offer an ‘information disclosure’ opportunity, as well as a 
way to ‘convince’ consumers if green products are to be considered as ‘credence 
goods’;6 b) when there is environmental product differentiation, the effect is 
certainly VA specific, being a direct outcome of a voluntary action which is not 
undertaken by the industry as a whole. 
3.1. VAs in models of environmental quality enhancing  
Cases where consumer’s environmental preferences affect the whole 
industry market demand for a homogeneous good are analysed by Garvie 
(1999). His model includes the two market demand shift and increased slope effects 
discussed above.  
Garvie’s paper studies the behaviour of (identical) firms involved in 
Cournot competition and coping with a market characterised by the presence of 
green consumerism (for the sake of simplicity, consumers’ preferences are 
assumed to be separable into product and environmental characteristics). When 
at least one firm improves its environmental performance, industry demand 
shifts outwards. In order to consider a quite general case, it is assumed that 
consumers perceive only a fraction of the total environmental damage resulting 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of the implications of this hypothesis, see Cavaliere (2000). 
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from the production process,7 with the two polar situations of zero and total 
information as special cases. The more consumers are informed, the larger the 
market demand outward shift induced by a voluntary emission reduction, and 
the steeper the demand curve. Given the presence of demand effects, firms will 
use both their production and emission reduction decisions as strategic variables 
(both the quantity produced and the related emissions affect market price).  
A number of quite interesting findings do emerge from this theoretical 
setting: 
- The optimal firms’ voluntary effort to reduce emissions is equal to zero 
only if consumers attribute no value to the environmental damage caused 
by the production of the good. Moreover, voluntary abatement is an 
increasing function of consumers’ sensitivity to environmental variables. 
- However, when consumers have a partial awareness of environmental 
damage, firms’ abatement is sub-optimal with respect to the socially 
optimal abatement level. 
- Firms strategies are strategic complements with respect to abatement 
efforts. Hence, if an appropriate policy for VA adoption is found for some 
polluters, other firms will react accordingly by also reducing their 
emissions. 
- VAs may have strong anticompetitive effects. Market power is enhanced 
when VAs are adopted. This effect is higher the greater access consumers 
have to information and the larger the marginal damage produced by the 
industry production process. 
- Market structure affects social welfare: 
a) As a result of free-riding on market demand effects, a larger 
number of firms results in a lowering of the total abatement 
effort; 
b) A higher welfare level can be achieved if firms are allowed to 
co-operate in their emission strategies, e.g. through an 
industrial association which determines a voluntary abatement 
code for all firms in the industry, although this entails higher 
market prices.  
The last result is particularly interesting because they show that more 
concentrated industries, where co-ordination among firms can be achieved 
more easily, can guarantee higher abatement levels (higher environmental 
effectiveness) as well as increased social welfare (higher economic efficiency).  
Although Garvie’s analysis deals mainly with unilateral commitments, its 
findings are directly applicable and possess strong policy implications for the 
whole family of VAs. In particular, the results regarding the positive effects 
ensuing from consumers’ increased awareness of firms’ environmental 
performances highlight the importance of information disclosure policies in 
spite of an increase in firms’ market power (or higher demand slope effect). In 
contrast, the superior performance of a concentrated market structure basically 
                                                 
7 A few convincing explanations of why consumers may be imperfectly informed about the intrinsic 
environmental quality of purchased goods are offered by Nadaï and Morel (1999). 
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calls for a positive attitude by public authorities towards horizontal agreements 
undertaken with a view to protecting the environment. 
An example of a generalization of the basic industry-wide demand effect is  
when VAs are also used as a means to increment consumer sensitivity to a 
firm’s environmental performance. In other words, VAs can be considered as a  
way to increase a firm’s reputation vis à vis imperfectly informed consumers, 
which are characterised by green preferences, but are unable to assess the 
quality of the commodities they purchase. 
Numerous studies have sought solutions to this asymmetric information 
problem. In particular, we know that possible solutions are attained because 
firms have strong incentives to build a green reputation for their goods. Such 
incentives enable consumers to evaluate the environmental quality of a product 
from a given period onwards. As pointed out by Cavaliere (2000), two cases 
correspond to this situation:  
a) a firm’s environmental performance is an ‘experience good’, i.e. 
individuals can infer the environmental quality of a good when consuming 
it;8  
b) environmental quality becomes ‘common knowledge’ once some form of 
a publicly recognised VA is adopted. 
Indeed, in the latter case, in which environmental quality is a ‘credence 
good’, i.e. a situation where the environmental impact of a product cannot be 
ascertained either by purchasing it, the adoption of a VA enables firms to 
acquire a reputation otherwise impossible to reach.  
This point is shown by Cavaliere (2000) by using a model with repeated 
interactions between a monopolist9 (or an industrial association) and a large 
number of uninformed consumers. In the model, the main result regarding the 
firm’s behaviour is that, if the firm characterises its type as a high quality one, it 
will find it optimal to produce a high quality good in every period. If the firm 
characterises its type as a low quality one, it will find it optimal to randomize its 
production between a ‘green’ or a ‘brown’ good at least in the first periods of 
the repeated game.  
Hence, the main lesson is that unawareness by consumers may induce a 
self-enforcing solution of the market failure in the form of voluntary over-
compliance. More precisely, it is the presence of poorly informed consumers 
that forces firms to adopt VAs, at least in the long run.  
3.2. Quality differentiation and voluntary over-compliance 
As discussed above, consumers’ sensitivity to environment quality may 
also provide a firm with an incentive to increase its own demand and market 
share vis à vis its competitors. This can be done by differentiating its products 
                                                 
8 For example, this could be the case of tourism destination mainly based on environmental 
resources. 
9 In particular, Cavaliere (2000) considers the case of a monopolist who may be exogenously less or 
more suited to undertaking a VA. This fact is private information, so that consumers do not know 
what type of firm they are facing. 
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with respect to those offered by competitors, thus creating a niche market 
where a higher market price can be imposed. 
The standard Hotelling’s model of product differentiation can be applied 
to analyse firms’ green differentiation strategies. Assume that the market is 
segmented because consumers display a different attitude towards “green” 
efforts by firms or ‘green’ product characteristics. Also assume that there are 
only two firms and that, as usual in this kind of model, the interaction between 
the two firms is modelled as a two-stage game; a first stage in which firms 
decide their product’s identifying characteristic, and a second stage in which 
price competition takes place.  
The choice of emission levels is equivalent to the location choice in 
Hotelling’s model. Hence, as is well known from the work by D’Aspremont and 
Gabszevicz (1986), if costs for consumers that cannot buy the most preferred 
product are non-linear, the firms’ optimal choice in this kind of model is to 
differentiate. This point is formally shown for example by Arora and 
Gangopadyay (1995). When firms can choose their emission technology, in 
equilibrium there will be two types of firms in the market, one with high and the 
other one with low emissions per unit of output. Lutz, Lyon and Maxwell 
(2001) generalise these findings to the case in which consumers do not have 
complete awareness of the environmental benefits. In both cases, the VA can 
be seen as the choice by the “greener” firms to engage in non-mandatory 
abatement levels, while the less environmental efficient firm will simply meet 
the already existing standards.  
With regard to policy design, it seems that although it may be welfare 
improving, the optimality of a purely voluntary outcome is questionable. On the 
one hand, Cremer and Thisse (1999), in a vertical differentiation model, find 
that the market tends to under-provide environmental quality even in the 
absence of externalities or spillovers. More recently, Bagnoli and Watts (2003) 
have confirmed this outcome, apart from in a few cases in which the nature of 
competition (in particular Cournot vs Bertrand) may lead to ‘excessive’ 
voluntary emission reduction.10  
An advantage of VAs is that they can be used in a policy mix. Therefore, 
product differentiation models can constitute a useful starting point for an 
analysis of how VAs perform when ‘command and control’ or other ‘economic’ 
environmental policy tools are also adopted by the regulator. The conclusion by 
Arora and Gangopadyay (1995) and Lutz et al. (2000)11 is that in a framework of 
heterogeneous tastes and product differentiation the use of an effective minimum standard is 
recommended. Intuitively, the ‘worst’ firm wants to move as little as possible from 
its optimum and, as a consequence, will meet the mandatory standard exactly. 
Then, in order to maintain product differentiation, the best firm will over-
comply with the standard. In other words, when a firm  chooses a higher 
                                                 
10 More in general, higher voluntary abatement levels are shown to occur in the case of Cournot 
competition vis à vis a case of Bertrand competition. Given the worst outcome of the first 
competition regime, a trade-off between environmental effectiveness and competition arises.  
11 For example, see Ronnen (1991).  
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emission control level, other firms will also have an incentive to choose a higher 
level. Therefore, a regulator can increase the whole industry emission abatement 
by forcing the most polluting firm to reduce its emissions. 
Reverse effects arise when VAs are accompanied by an environmental tax. 
Arora and Gangopadyay (1995) show that the tax reduces a firm’s abatement 
effort, which would otherwise be stimulated by product differentiation. Hence, 
if more emission abatement is to be achieved, the production of the good must 
be subsidised. With a subsidy, a firm can increase its clean-up effort at the same 
price, thus increasing its market share. To avoid this outcome, non-subsidised 
firms will react with an enhancement of their environmental performance.12  
Finally, in the case of tradable emission permits, the introduction of a VA 
modifies the traditional condition that states that permit trading will occur until 
the marginal abatement costs of different firms are equalised. Being a net seller 
of permits becomes a way of reinforcing the clean image of the firm. In 
equilibrium, there will be fewer trades than predicted by the rule based on the 
equalisation of marginal costs. 
As in the case of homogeneous commodities, product differentiation may 
be related to the consumers’ inability to directly assess the ‘green’ nature of the 
good they purchase. In this case, we should expect that some goods would find 
their way onto the market pretending to be ‘green’, even though they are not, 
thus bringing about ‘adverse selection’, like market failures.13 Under these 
circumstances, one may raise the question if a ‘certification’ of the 
environmental quality of the product, in the form of a green label, may solve the 
market failure. Unfortunately, existing economic literature on this is mostly 
sceptical.  
For example Kuhn (1999) analyses the case of a public agency that can 
optimally design a series of requirements to be satisfied by firms that want to be 
granted an ‘ecolabel’. As usual in this kind of model, what the public agency is 
aiming at is a ‘separating’ equilibrium, in which the ‘green’ and the ‘bad’ firm 
reveal their nature by voluntarily choosing different remuneration schemes. 
Environmentally effective solutions are found only under quite specific 
conditions. 
The firm’s side of this framework is analysed in depth by Nadaï and Morel 
(1999, 2000). Similarly to Cavaliere (2000), these authors  have a pessimistic 
view of consumers’ cognitive gap: environmental quality is a ‘credence good’, so 
that a ‘green label’ (and a regulator entitled to issue it) is needed in order to 
direct green consumers’ willingness to pay. The effectiveness and consensus to 
such policy depends on the assumptions regarding market structure. In the case 
of a heterogeneous industry in which firms produce only one (more or less 
‘green’) good, the worst (‘brown’) firm would always lose out from the 
implementation of an ecolabel. Moreover, only selective criteria by the regulator 
                                                 
12 However, subsidies have a social cost that may offset the environmental benefit that they provide 
in this setting. 
13 For a laboratory experiment dealing with this problem, see Cason and Gangadharan (2002). 
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seem to be able to ensure environmental effectiveness.14 Put together, the 
previous two findings imply that most firms would oppose the implementation 
of an effective green label. 
Less pessimistic results are obtained when firms are able to produce goods 
of different quality. Under such framework - which mimics the case of EU 
firms that have adopted the system of European labels for domestic appliances 
– Nadaï and Morel (2000) argue that all firms could be better off after the 
implementation of an ecolabel, although the relative competitiveness among 
them is affected. In addition, by choosing the selectivity criteria of the ecolabel, 
there is room for win-win criteria, which not only ensure environmental 
effectiveness but  also leave firms better off with respect to the situation 
without the green label option. However, regulators cannot stimulate 
environmental innovation by firms with optimal ecolabels alone, at least for 
innovation costs of a magnitude comparable to that of production costs. The 
pre-requisite for successful industry self-regulation with badly informed 
consumers seems to be the presence of low innovation costs and technological 
homogeneity (Nadaï and Morel, 2000). 
In short, a situation in which markets are oligopolistic and products are 
differentiated can actually favour the emergence of environmental VAs. In this 
setting, VAs become a form of ‘strategic social corporate responsibility’ 
(Bagnoli and Watts, 2003), where differentiation is aimed at increasing profits. 
From the public perspective, regulators on the one hand usually face a trade-off 
between guaranteeing competition and protecting the environment at a 
minimum cost; on the other hand, they know that the adoption of VAs usually 
alters the regular effectiveness of other policy instruments, be they minimum 
mandatory requirements, taxes or permits. 
4. VAs affecting a firm’s supply side 
Among the motives for adopting VAs usually identified in current 
literature, the strongest ones share the common characteristic of affecting a 
firm’s supply function. In comparison with demand effects, supply side 
incentives to adopt VAs represent a more heterogeneous category, 
encompassing quite different phenomena in spite of a (potentially) similar 
analytical representation.  
As represented in figure 3a, one can imagine the equilibrium effect of a 
VA as a downward shift of the firm’s (and market) supply curve (although, 
when considered in isolation, the adoption of VAs may be viewed as a costly 
activity). This usually leads to higher output and profits. In other words, when a 
VA is adopted, it yields a ‘net’ cost reduction. Intuitively, one could draw an 
analogy with the effect produced by the installation of a new, more efficient, 
machine in a firms’ plant. The purchase of the machine has a cost (as does the 
                                                 
14 For a similar result, see also Dosi and Moretto (2001). 
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adoption of a VA) but, once in place, the improved efficiency brought by the 
machine, determines a decrease of the firm’s overall production costs.15 
The main cases in which this effect occurs are when VAs are aimed at 
shaping regulatory activities and obtaining savings in the cost of firm’s inputs or 
in the use of them. The first case is sometimes referred to as a regulatory gain, 
identifiable in the larger profits accruing to firms from  avoiding the costs of 
some form of environmental regulation (the so-called regulatory threat). In 
particular, by signing a VA, firms can avoid or postpone the introduction of 
more costly regulations or regulatory instruments, or weaken the pressure from  
existing or forthcoming public intervention policies. In a more diluted form, 
this advantage may arise not merely from the behaviour of a specific regulator, 
but rather from the changed attitude of a local community, which generates a 
more friendly public environment in which the firm can operate.  
However, the above is an incomplete picture of what may considered a 
regulator gain. Regulators use ‘sticks’ as well as ‘carrots’; i.e. certain advantages 
may accrue to firms from subsidies or services granted by the regulator and 
aimed at addressing the environmental problem. This is a common situation in 
the US (e.g., the ‘Climate Change Action Plan’ or the ‘XL project’ by EPA16). 
Of course, in all these cases there is no ‘regulatory threat’, but a ‘regulatory 
promise’. 
Another category of absolute supply shifts not related to any regulatory 
threat is linked instead to the so-called ‘saving inputs’ effect (OECD, 1999). 
This term refers to the increased efficiency of the overall manufacturing process 
which can be associated with the adoption of a voluntary environmental code.17 
In other words, firms adopting a VA may consequently learn to optimise their 
production process or acquire information about best available technologies.  
Very similar to the previous one is an additional motive to adopt in the 
form of achieving input price reductions, which basically gives easier and more 
convenient access to the stock market (see Khanna, 2001 for a few examples). 
Existing literature often places this case in the general category of ‘market 
incentives’, but it should be pointed out that there is no significant change in 
demand for the goods produced by the firm.  
Finally, the case of upward supply curve shifts can also be considered, as 
illustrated in Figure 3b. We will discuss below how this less intuitive effect may 
occur when firms strategically use VAs to affect market structure. For example, 
it can be argued that a VA by firms with low abatement costs could be aimed at 
‘inducing regulation’. By ‘raising rival costs’, these firms could force less 
efficient firms to exit the market and gain more market shares for themselves. 
In other cases, a VA could promote the conditions for collusion among firms. 
There is some empirical evidence to support the statement that supply-
side effects represent the strongest incentive to the ‘voluntary’ reduction of 
                                                 
15 An analytical representation for these cost effects which take into account the firm’s individual 
effort and the number of participants into the VA is proposed by Brau and Carraro (2004). 
16 As for European cases, ten Brink, Morere and Wallace Jones (2002) report many examples 
referring to a series of national programs aimed at meeting Kyoto’s greenhouse gas reduction targets. 
17 For a discussion about VAs efficiency see Alberini and Segerson (2002). 
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polluting emissions. As for regulatory threats, Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett 
(2000) analysed data on toxic chemicals releases in the U.S. from 1987 to 1992 
and found that States with proportionally higher estimated membership of 
conservation groups (interpreted as a key variable in affecting regulatory threats) 
registered a lower level of toxic emissions .18 More directly, Khanna and Damon 
(1999) looked at the threat of mandatory regulation as an explanatory variable 
of firms’ participation in the EPA’s 33/50 voluntary program and found it to be 
statistically significant. Videras and Alberini (2000) get a similar result in the 
case of the WasteWise program. In another study, Darrell and Schwartz (1997) 
find statistically significant differences in the quantity and quality of 
environmental disclosure in 53 corporate reports in the years 1988, 1989 and 
1990 (post Exxon Valdez) in response to public policy pressure. For Europe, 
we can cite the well known (and controversial) ‘Declaration by German 
Industry and Trade on Global Warming Prevention’, motivated by the concern 
that legislative measures aimed at reducing CO2 emissions may have been 
established (e.g. Kristof and Rameshold, 1999). A similar incentive is behind the 
adoption of most national negotiated agreements, as studied in De Clercq 
(2002). 
The relevance of adoption incentives from the input market has also been 
widely studied. As for the effect of ‘information disclosure strategies’ 
(Tietenberg and Wheeler, 2001), Konar and Kohen (2001), among others, 
found that legally emitted toxic chemicals (as reported in the TRI) negatively 
affected firms’ market value.19 The same authors (Konar and Kohen, 1997) 
found that firms which experienced the largest negative returns from the stock 
market reacted with above average improvements of their environmental 
performances.20 As for the reaction of markets to the adoption of a VA, 
Khanna and Damon (1999) found mixed results in the case of the 33/50 
scheme, with negative effects on short run indicators and positive effects in the 
long run.21  
The role of the ‘saving inputs’ effect has been observed in various cases. 
For example, Lyon and Maxwell (2001) highlight this factor in the case of the 
3M “Pollution Prevention Pays” program. In the European experience, cost 
savings resulted as the most important benefit from the adoption of the EMAS 
scheme in a sample survey on accredited firms (Hillary et al., 1998).  
Finally, a few pilot examples of how VAs may be used to affect market 
structure have come out from the decisions of the EU DG Competition and 
some national competition authorities (Vedder, 2001; Martinez Lopez, 2002; 
Gremminger, Laurila and Miersch, 2001).  
                                                 
18 See also Maxwell and Lyon (2001). 
19 See also Lanoie, Laplante and Roy (1997). 
20 See also Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova (1998). 
21 This, and more pessimistic results such as those by Laplante and Lanoie (1994), cast some doubts 
about the real importance of this effect. For a similar assessment see Alberini and Segerson (2002). 
For a survey of the empirical literature see Tietenberg and Wheeler (2001). 
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4.1 Regulatory gains related to the presence of a regulatory threat. 
According to this interpretation, firms adopt a VA because they value this 
option as the most appropriate way of minimising the costs associated with the 
regulatory decisions of public authorities. The baseline assumption is that, 
by reducing emissions through a voluntary action, firms reach a given objective at lower 
costs than in circumstances where they are forced to meet a compulsory standard 
(OECD, 1999). 
There exist several explanations for why a voluntary regime can be less 
costly for both firms and the public sector. They include the greater flexibility 
associated to VAs in implementing environmental targets and the reduction in 
the size of transaction costs as a consequence of shared uncertainty between 
firms and public authorities (Glachant, 1999). 
Another possible scenario is when a well chosen abatement level can 
definitively pre-empt a regulatory intervention that would have imposed a 
tighter standard. In this case, however, the environmental target is less 
ambitious under the VA regime. This hypothesis represents the extreme of a 
situation where putting a legislative action into effect is costly and the benefits 
offered by the agreement are always greater than the fixed costs imposed by the 
legal intervention. Intuitively, in this case, the results in terms of the VA’s 
environmental effectiveness may not be satisfactory, given that a small 
voluntary abatement may pre-empt a strict compulsory requirement. Such 
situations will tend to occur when the public institution charged with signing a 
VA (e.g. the regulator) has a private agenda to satisfy which does not coincide 
with the objective of the institution (e.g. the legislator) charged with 
implementing other environmental policies. In this case, to sign a VA is, first of 
all, a ‘shortcut’ to satisfying the regulator’s interests. Therefore, firms may be 
able to sign a VA which is less stringent than a truly effective environmental 
policy. 
4.1.1. Basic models of bilateral bargaining 
In the sequel, we will discuss both theoretical examples where firms use 
VAs to pre-empt a stricter regulation that they cannot influence and models in 
which firms can also influence the severity of the regulatory threat, i.e. in which 
regulatory capture is also considered. In order to analyse the different aspects of 
a firm’s behaviour, it may be useful to start from a basic model introduced by 
Segerson and Miceli (1998, 1999), where the regulatory threat comes in the 
form of a mandatory regulation. 
This model considers the strategic interaction between a single firm (it 
may well be an industry association) and a regulator, and its key point is 
represented by the lower costs faced by the firm when it undertakes a VA 
negotiated with a regulator, as compared to when regulation is enforced 
through legislation. The results can be applied whatever the regulatory threat, 
including taxation schemes, and even when there is uncertainty about future 
regulations.  
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Let us assume that the regulator is entitled to bargain over the level of 
emission abatement by the firm, while being subject to a social welfare 
maximisation constraint. For the social welfare, a negotiated agreement would 
be the preferred outcome if it is  assumed  that transaction costs for the public 
side are lower under the voluntary regime or that the social value of the 
establishment of a mandatory standard is hampered by uncertainty regarding the 
actual intervention by a legislative assembly. The agreement is potentially 
profitable for the firm as well, since it can pre-empt the legislative standard 
(which would entail higher compliance costs).  
The outcome of a bargaining process is closely affected by the payoff that 
the parts would get if no agreement is reached. The regulator maximises the 
expected net social benefit by offering a given abatement level to the polluting 
firm. The latter decides whether or not to sign the agreement. If it accepts the 
offer, unitary costs of abatement are lower than if it was to satisfy a legal 
standard. If it rejects the offer, it is faced with a (possible) intervention by a 
legislative authority which can impose a minimum standard with higher unitary 
implementation costs. The probability of intervention (in the baseline case 
independent of the fact that the regulator offers an agreement) usually affects 
the level of abatement which is implemented under the voluntary regime. 
On the whole, the main result of Segerson and Miceli’s model is that, 
given that the unitary costs of pollution reduction are lower when an agreement 
is signed, an interval of abatement levels for which a VA is signed emerges, i.e. 
both parties find it optimal to adopt the VA. The only pre-requisite is that the 
existence of a legislative threat (even weak) is perceived by the firm.  
The basic model can be extended in several ways. For example, one may 
wonder whether or not the regulator might affect the interval in which an 
agreement can occur by acting on the firm’s costs under the voluntary regime. 
In this case, Segerson and Miceli (1998) show that a subsidy to firms that accept 
to sign the agreement makes it possible to enlarge the interval in which an 
agreement is possible and desirable.22 One may also ask what happens when the 
assumption about lower costs on the public side is relaxed. By considering the 
above framework, the existence of an equilibrium voluntary abatement is no 
longer ensured, being instead contingent on the regulator’s and firm’s payoffs 
(Segerson, 1998).23  
However, the existence of a ‘negotiation interval’ emerges again if the 
hypothesis of a welfare maximising regulator is discarded. This is done by 
Hansen (1999) and Glachant (2004), who consider the case where the regulator 
and the legislator have two different objective functions, with different 
                                                 
22 The size of this interval depends on the severity of the threat and on the social cost of public 
funds employed in financing the subsidy. The stronger the threat and the lower the social cost of 
public funds, the more likely is that a VA will be signed. 
23 It is however confirmed that there exists a positive relationship between the severity of the threat, 
the extent of transaction costs under the mandatory regime and the width of the range of abatement 
levels which allow for the negotiation to take place. 
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evaluations of consumers’ surplus, firms’ profits and environmental goals.24 
These differences can be primarily explained by contrasting political views. 
Alternatively, a regulatory agency could have special interests consisting, for 
example, in the saving of its time or budget resources, as well as direct fringe or 
monetary benefits granted by the firm to the members of the agency. The 
legislative body may also be subject to lobbying by the polluters. Whatever the 
arguments of the regulator’s private agenda or the political biases of legislative 
assemblies, both Hansen (1999) and Glachant (2004) show that an interval of 
abatement levels at which the regulator and firms agree to sign a VA may exist, 
in particular when there is a sufficiently strong disagreement about policy 
priorities between the legislator and the regulator, and when the firm’s discount 
rates are high.  
The intuition behind this result is that, when leaving the decision on the 
abatement level to the legislative body, the regulator could be faced with a 
situation which may prove very harmful to achieving its own objectives. In this 
case, the legislative threat is also affecting the regulator. Rather than a case of 
‘regulatory capture’, it is a case of legislative pre-emption from the regulator’s 
side. Optimality of the negotiated VA can be quite problematical. If the 
‘benevolent social planner’ is the regulator, the use of VAs should usually be 
seen as a welfare improving policy. Conversely, if it is reasonable to assume that 
the legislator is relatively more resistant to lobbying activities than the regulator, 
the implementation of a VA could be socially harmful.  
In general, this approach explains why the use of VAs is more often 
encouraged by the executive branches of the government rather than by the 
legislative bodies. 
4.1.2. The multi-firm case 
What limits the previous analysis is the hypothesis of bilateral bargaining, 
which implies the absence of strategic competition by firms, or the presence of 
an industry association whose behaviour is not affected by the number and the 
nature of its members. By extending their model to the case of a duopoly, 
Segerson and Miceli (1999) argue that two cases must be considered. A first  is 
one in which a VA with only one of the two firms is sufficient to pre-empt a 
legislative intervention, and the second is where pre-emption is certain only if 
both firms adopt the VA.  
The first case directly leads to the issue of free-riding. If pre-emption 
benefits yielded by the adoption of a VA are not fully excludable, then firms 
have an incentive to under-supply their own level of emission abatement. From 
a general economic theory perspective, free riding is likely to depend directly  
on the number of firms in the industry. Moreover, the phenomenon is stronger 
when the possibility of voluntary participation is accounted for (Dixit and 
Olson, 2000). In Segerson and Miceli (1999) it is shown that only one firm signs 
                                                 
24 In Segerson and Miceli (1998) the optimal abatement levels for the legislator and the regulator 
differ only because of the lower costs in the case of negotiation and not because of a conflict in their 
objectives. 
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the agreement. This result is independent of the firms’ cost structure, which 
implies that there is no automatic identification of the kind of firms which 
actually sign the agreement. When an industry with n firms is considered, the 
important question is if free-riding is actually able to completely undermine the 
signing of any efficient VA.  
The theoretical results derived by Dawson and Segerson (2000, 2003), 
with a model with homogeneous firms and a fixed environmental target to be 
met, support the conclusion that partial agreements signed by a subset of firms 
are possible, as long as the avoided cost from the occurrence of regulatory 
intervention is greater than or equal to the participation cost (i.e., a ‘chicken 
game’ like situation). Brau and Carraro (2004), in a model with asymmetric 
spillovers, i.e. where the benefits of the VA go to the signatory firms and only 
partly to free-riders, show that a VA can be signed even without a fixed 
environmental target. In this case, provided that a minimum participation level 
is reached, a VA will be signed, and is likely to be joined by all firms in the 
industry.25 
Free-riding problems disappear when pre-emption is certain only if all 
firms adopt the VA, but at the cost of a lower probability of reaching an 
agreement. This probability depends on the dispersion of the distribution of 
firms’ costs, and on the number of firms. Ceteris paribus, in the bargaining 
process the regulator has now to rely on a higher probability of legislative 
intervention. An in depth analysis of the latter case has been provided by 
Manzini and Mariotti (2003). By applying the Rubinstein’s (1982) model of 
alternating offers, they show that a ‘toughest firm principle’ holds, i.e. 
negotiations in a multifirm case are driven by the firm which, in a bilateral 
agreement with the regulator, would obtain the lowest abatement level. 
Moreover, the main comparative statics results (e.g. those related to variations 
in marginal abatement costs) are driven by how the change in parameters affects 
the market position of the ‘toughest’ (or pivotal) firm. 
In addition to the probability of legislative intervention, another tool that 
increases the power of the threat in a multiple firm case is the possibility of 
‘firm-specific pre-emption’. This situation was introduced by Segerson (1998) 
and consists of the provision of a compulsory intervention in the event that a 
given standard is not reached by some of the firms entering the market. The 
free-riding problem is of course solved because pre-emption becomes an 
‘excludable good’. Notice that, in order to implement this situation, the 
regulator must possess the ability to intervene against non signing firms. 
Legislative schemes that threaten the automatic introduction of taxation or 
direct regulation if the VA is not adopted seem to satisfy this requirement.26 
Is the relevance of the free-riding problem affected by dynamic 
considerations? When no agreement is signed because of opportunistic 
                                                 
25 According to Brau and Carraro (2004), a policy mix approach can additionally reduce the negative 
effects from free-riding. Namely, Pareto improving situations can be reached if an adequate 
minimum abatement constraint is imposed.  
26 The reader may recognise that this description can apply to the Dutch and Danish CO2 taxation-
VA schemes. 
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behaviour, we expect that in an environment where polluters are allowed to 
“learn” and repeat their game (i.e. a situation in which there is no certain 
implementation of the regulatory threat), free-riding incentives should become 
less harmful. Moreover, when pre-emption by a partial agreement is allowed, 
the possibility of entry in the industry can be taken into account. In this case, 
Dawson and Segerson (2003) show that with zero entry costs, the free-riding 
incentive is offset and full industry participation occurs in the long run. With 
positive entry cost, partial participation is still possible, but to a smaller extent 
than when only a short run equilibrium is considered. 
The conclusions that these results lead us to are probably still preliminary. 
They can be summarised as follows: a) In the multi-firm case, a free-riding 
problem emerges and this reduces the likelihood of adoption and the 
effectiveness of VAs; b) The free-riding problem can be solved, either by 
implementing the agreement only when all firms sign it, or by promoting entry 
of new firms in the industry, or by designing policy mixes which incorporate 
firm-specific threats or incentives. c) An increase in the number of firms, i.e. a 
more competitive market structure, makes the previous options less effective in 
favouring the adoption of VAs. In addition, the occurrence of a ‘toughest firm 
principle’ is likely to undermine the environmental effectiveness of signed VAs 
when abatement costs are highly heterogeneous. 
4.1.3. Shaping the severity of the regulatory intervention:  
Regarding VAs as merely a tool for pre-empting mandatory regulation 
sometimes seems too simplistic. On the one hand, regulators may simply want 
something more than what firms are offering voluntarily. On the other hand, 
and more importantly, firms might strategically use some kinds of VAs in order 
to affect the size of the overall level of emission reduction.  
When the latter possibility is considered, the assessment of some of the 
cases analysed so far may change significantly. For example, in section 3.2, the 
option of product differentiation was viewed as an example of voluntary over-
compliance beneficial for the economy as a whole, and the setting of a 
minimum environmental quality standard resulted in a policy that improved 
welfare. However, according to Lutz et al. (2000), in a product differentiated 
industry, a firm may reduce its total voluntary environmental effort and the size 
of the industry’s mandatory requirements (compared to a situation where the 
firms and the regulator set these levels simultaneously) if it is able to anticipate the 
regulator’s definition of the minimum standard with some level of voluntary emission reduction. 
More importantly, social welfare is lower when this happens. 
The intuition is that, when a firm undertakes a quality improving 
investment, it usually ‘ties’ itself to that specific quality level, i.e. any move away 
from the latter is likely to require a fixed cost  to sustain a new change in 
quality. For a ‘not pre-committed and welfare maximiser’ regulator this is 
relevant since firms’ profits are part of social welfare. Without any previous 
voluntary action by the firm, the regulator would set its optimum mandatory 
abatement requirement. If the regulator imposed the same standard after the 
VA, firms’ profits would be lower due to the need for new positioning. Hence, 
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by acting first, a high quality firm can commit to a relatively lower quality level 
which maximises its profits given the regulator’s reaction function. This (social 
welfare) function induces the regulator to set a weaker minimum quality level 
which  will balance firms’ marginal profit losses with marginal consumer surplus 
and environmental benefits.  
Broadly speaking, there is a first mover advantage. Social welfare will be 
higher if the regulator can set a minimum standard prior to or simultaneously 
with the definition of the best firm’s performance within the VA. The obvious 
policy implication therefore is that the regulator must intervene by enhancing 
mandatory standards before the VA (which sometimes takes years to be 
implemented) has displaced all its lock-in effects. On closer inspection, one can 
interpret the choice of ex post weaker standards by the regulator when firms 
‘move first’ as a ‘textbook case’ of dynamic inconsistency.  
Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1999) specifically analyse the regulation of 
polluting emissions through environmental taxation in a dynamic setting to 
clarify the time inconsistency issue. They consider that voluntary compliance 
and the setting of a taxation time path (the threat) are part of a repeated game 
that the firm is playing with the government. With perfect information, by 
choosing its own voluntary abatement level, the firm knows perfectly well what 
the final tax rate will be. The main conclusion favours the adoption of a policy 
mix approach. In particular, if the government can pre-commit itself to a fixed 
tax rate, voluntary abatement (or environmental innovation) would be lower 
than without pre-commitment, but social welfare would be usually higher.27 
Therefore, as already mentioned when presenting the results in Lutz et al. 
(2000), a more widespread adoption of VAs does not necessarily lead to higher 
social welfare. 
This negative view of pure self-regulation initiatives can be toned down by 
considering that the adoption of a unilateral VA is only one of the ways in 
which firms can pre-empt regulatory intervention. Lobbying activities are 
probably the most common tool used by firms to achieve their goals. The 
economic literature on VAs has pointed out the risk of ‘cosmetic agreements’ 
concealing lobbying actions on governments; and special attention has been 
devoted to regulatory capture processes. It has been noted (OECD, 1999) that, 
for this phenomenon to occur in the case of VAs, the regulator must derive a 
utility from these lobbying activities.28 In the presence of such a regulator, an 
‘appropriate’ combination of environmental VAs and lobbying activities may 
lead to the elimination or, at least, the mitigation of the environmental 
regulation. 
The issues of regulatory capture, lobbying activities and their relationship 
with the nature and effectiveness of VAs are specifically discussed by Maxwell et 
                                                 
27 With some degree of caution, Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1999) note that their result could depend 
on the linear specification of the damage function employed in their model. 
28 The ‘size’ of the capture is partially exogenous (the regulator satisfies its private agenda instead of 
social welfare), and partially endogenous (to the extent that firms’ lobbying activities have an effect 
on the regulator’s decisions). Basic references to a theory of regulatory capture are Stigler (1971) and 
Becker (1983). See also Laffont and Tirole (1991). 
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al. (2000). The setting of a continuum of equilibrium mandatory standards 
(between zero and the social optimal level) is accounted for within a framework 
where firms undertake VAs and lobbying activities aimed at modifying the 
abatement level defined by the regulator. Broadly speaking, firms are seen as 
being able to set a ‘policy mix’ through which they tackle the regulatory threat. 
Both activities are, however, costly initiatives. The resulting model enables us to 
address a number of issues, from the desirability of stakeholders’ participation 
to the interactions between market structure and VAs.  
In Maxwell et al. (2000) by choosing whether and how much to voluntarily 
abate a firm is aiming at three objectives: to pre-empt stakeholders (e.g. 
consumers) and the regulator’s intervention; to influence the regulator’s 
intervention to its own advantage; to improve competitiveness with respect to 
other firms. Firms achieve these objectives sequentially and therefore the model 
is structured as a non-cooperative three-stage game. The ‘endogenization’ of the 
severity of the regulatory threat is modelled in the second stage as an ‘influence’ 
game played between firms and consumers,29 with the latter favouring a stricter 
regulation and ready to ‘activate the game’ if the total cost of lobbying is smaller 
than the expected benefit in terms of stronger mandatory abatement levels. The 
payoff of the influence game is the definition of a mandatory abatement level to 
be added to the voluntary one. The total emission reduction achieved by the 
firms is thus the sum of the two components. 
When firms self-regulate, they reduce consumers’ incentives to undertake 
lobbying activities, but must also compare the advantages of VAs vis à vis the 
gains from their lobbying activities. Different hypotheses can be made about the 
costs and benefits of lobbying. It is usually recognised that industries have a 
competitive advantage in the environmental policy arena, a ‘stylised fact’ which 
can be represented by assuming that lobbying costs are directly related to the 
number of components of the pressure group (due to organisational problems).  
Maxwell et al. (2000) agree with this view and show that, within the 
influence game, the level of mandatory abatement is lower than when no 
lobbying activities are undertaken, but also argue that the VA option is even 
more cost effective in reducing mandatory requirements. Under reasonable 
conditions, a firm is even able to offer a VA which makes it unprofitable for 
consumers to engage in the influence game. Self-regulation by firms would 
therefore primarily be  instigated by the aim of ‘keeping stakeholders quiet’.  
This political economy approach leads to a number of interesting results: 
- Suitability of self-regulation. When considering the costs of regulatory capture 
activities for both consumers and firms, pre-emption of the influence 
game Pareto-dominates the case when the influence game is played. The 
fact that it can actually be played indicates the occurrence of a prisoner’s 
dilemma situation. 
- Trade-off between market structure and environmental effectiveness. The maximum 
voluntary abatement is higher when firms can collude in choosing their 
own abatement levels. As a consequence, an antitrust policy which allows 
                                                 
29 For an application of influence games in the economic theory of regulation, see Becker (1983).  
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firms to co-ordinate on voluntary abatement30 leads to beneficial self-
regulation. 
- Voluntary abatement and regulatory threat. An increased threat of government 
regulation, determined for example by a change consumer power, usually 
induces firms to increase their voluntary reduction of emissions. 
- Ambiguous effects of stakeholders involvement within a VA setting. Bigger 
consumer power may induce firms to raise voluntary abatement, but it 
may crowd out self-regulation in favour of (lower) mandatory standards 
determined on the basis of lobbying fights. The policy implication is that 
the stakeholders’ involvement in the political process should not be 
financed unless when organisational costs are so high as to ‘block’ 
consumers’ entry into the influence game. 
In brief, VAs can be a strategic variable through which firms can affect 
regulation. Regulatory gains arise from the avoidance of lobbying conflicts or, at 
least, from making these fights less intense. Given that the latter can  usually be 
seen as an unproductive expense, this is  another argument in favour of VAs. 
4.2. Cost reductions not related to a regulatory threat 
It is not uncommon to find examples in which there are no regulatory 
threats to motivate polluters’ voluntary reduction of emissions. Lyon and 
Maxwell (2003) observe this in the case of some public voluntary schemes, such 
as those related to the U.S. Climate Change Action Plan. When there is no 
explicit regulatory threat, the cost advantage accruing from VAs is a somewhat 
more direct one, no longer in the form of the avoidance of a costlier regulatory 
regime, but in the form of a real cost decrease. We distinguish these cost 
advantages between those arising as a result of decisions  made by public 
authorities and those coming from the input market. 
 
4.2.1. “Subsidy based” VAs. 
It is well known that many VAs provide for financial and or technical 
assistance. This is certainly common for public voluntary schemes, where 
polluters know ex ante the nature of the benefits designed by the regulator; but 
may also be likely with many negotiated agreements, where a role for public 
authorities is often established. 
The easiest participation incentive is providing firms with a subsidy, which 
induces a downward shift of the supply curve and, under some regularity 
conditions on the demand side, an increase in their profits. Other than 
monetary, the incentive may be ‘in kind’, with specific services aimed at 
improving the abatement effort by the firm. The provision of these services can 
be modelled as a spillover effect which reduces firms’ total production costs. 
Moreover, regulatory agencies may grant additional flexibility in some aspects of 
the production process not directly related to emission reduction. This 
                                                 
30 Lawyers use the term of ‘block exemptions’ (from competition law). For a discussion of this aspect 
within the EU competition law see Vedder (2000, 2001) and Martinez Lopez (2002). 
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additional flexibility takes the form of a production cost reduction and shifts the 
supply curve downward. Referring to the EPA’s ‘XL Project’, Boyd and 
Blackman (2002) label this form of negotiated agreement ‘tailored regulation’ 
and develop an analytical model of VA adoption by a ‘tailored company’ in an 
oligopolistic market framework.  
This latter feature of the model is important because it allows us to design 
a firm’s pay-off function defined not only by the cost difference under the 
voluntary regime, but also by the new market equilibrium resulting from the 
adoption of the VA. In particular, when an additional firm signs the VA, profits 
may be lower even when more participants in the VA lead to higher subsidies or 
larger marginal cost reductions.  
Brau and Carraro (2004) show formally how this phenomenon may occur 
as a function of the shape of the demand function in a model of collective VAs, 
where the incentive to sign a VA is the technological spillover that signatory 
firms receive. In this case, signatory firms prefer that some of their competitors 
be excluded from the VA. In order to guarantee higher social welfare, the 
regulator should of course rule out ‘close membership’ rules in the VA.31  
The latter is basically an indication for an efficient design of VAs. From a 
more general normative viewpoint, regulators should however offer a VA with 
technical and financial assistance only when it represents the most efficient 
solution. Wu and Babcock (1999) deal with this point by considering a model in 
which the regulator wants to achieve an environmental target by the n-firms in 
the market, either under a mandatory or a voluntary regime. If the regulator 
chooses to promote the VA option, then it must spend public funds for 
offering services and subsidies in order to induce firms’ participation. The 
authors show that the voluntary regime will be advantageous if the cost of 
public funds used under the VA is less than the difference in implementation 
costs between mandatory and voluntary programs plus the difference between 
the private and public cost of government services. 
Of special interest is how to identify which conditions may enhance the 
relative efficiency of VAs. Wu and Babcock (1999) find that the relative 
efficiency of a VA increases: i) when the rivalry of government services is low, i.e. when 
services have a high content of public good and the regulator is not forced to 
‘tailor’ its intervention for each firm; ii) when government services are less expensive 
than an equivalent private effort, a condition which may depend on co-ordination or 
information constraints by the private sector; iii) when enforcement costs of VAs are 
low compared to mandatory programs. 
The previous results can be additionally qualified with some dynamic 
considerations. It is well known that environmental taxes may induce under- or 
over-investment, as well as undesirable distorting effects. For example, Laffont 
and Tirole (1996) show that, in a dynamic framework, taxes or permits may 
induce firms to over-invest in environmental innovation in order to by-pass the 
                                                 
31 For a case in which the EC Directorate-General Competition has made inapplicable the provision 
of a VA which limited some advantages only to original members, see the article by Gremminger, 
Laurila and Miersch (2001) on the Eco-Emballage waste recovering system. 
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fiscal burden. A VA is theoretically able to perform better in this case (Carraro 
and Siniscalco, 1994; Carraro et al., 1994). Still in a dynamic framework, VAs are 
also optimal when environmental innovation has positive spillovers on other 
firms, which need to be internalised in order to avoid underinvestment or 
delayed adoption (e.g., see D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Carraro and 
Topa, 1994). In those in which the government needs two instruments to 
correct two externalities - one related to pollution and one to innovation - VAs 
play an important role in stimulating environmental friendly innovation in 
conditions of market failures and imperfect competition. It is also argued that in 
order to reduce pollution in strategic industries that produce tradable goods, 
VAs should be used instead of other effective instruments, such as command 
and control, permits and taxes, which distort competition (Carraro and 
Siniscalco, 1992). The same argument becomes even stronger  when global 
externalities are at work.  
VAs based on the granting of subsidies may be viewed in a positive 
perspective as well. This has been done by Lyon and Maxwell (2003), with a 
three stage game-theory model with heterogeneous firms. Firms can achieve 
some environmental targets either through a pre-emptive unilateral 
commitment (without financial incentives from the regulator), or stimulated by 
a pollution tax, or by joining a public voluntary scheme (which includes a 
subsidy by the regulator).32 The latter is offered only if the legislative process 
fails to introduce the pollution tax, since the subsidised voluntary program is 
preferred to inaction. A key feature of this model is the possibility for firms to 
influence the legislative process by ‘investing’ in political pressure in order to 
stop the adoption of a pollution tax.  
Within this framework, the possible intervention of the regulator by 
means of a ‘cost-cutting’ VA, in addition to involve the use of costly public 
funds, may play a crucial role in targeting firms’ strategies. However, Lyon and 
Maxwell (2003) conclude that public voluntary schemes are generally a 
suboptimal policy instrument. Thus:  
- Under the hypothesis that voluntary actions are as costly as mandatory 
measures, the offer of a public voluntary scheme is preferred to taxation 
only when political opposition is high. 
- In addition, if the taxation level is highly sensitive to political resistance, 
social welfare may be greater if the regulator  agrees not to offer any 
public voluntary scheme. 
- In any case, social welfare is higher when unilateral action pre-empts 
government action. 
In sum, the use of subsidies can reduce welfare by increasing an industry’s 
resistance to socially beneficial tax proposals and by reducing  incentives for the 
industry to engage in welfare-enhancing self-regulation. Broadly speaking, if 
subsidies are made available firms become ‘tougher’ in their opposition to 
adopting environmental taxation, and they will view alternative self-regulation 
                                                 
32 In Maxwell and Lyon this form of VA is called public voluntary agreement. 
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initiatives as being relatively less convenient the alternative self-regulation 
initiatives. Lyon and Maxwell (2003) therefore conclude that policymakers 
should be diffident towards the use of publicly subsidised VAs. It remains 
unanswered if regulators may credibly commit not to opt for VAs when the 
legislation fails to address the environmental problem.  
4.2.2. VAs motivated by saving inputs incentives 
To conclude this section devoted to VAs induced by supply-side gains, let 
us briefly analyse the nature of cost advantages not directly related to the 
financial or technical services provided by public authorities. 
A hypothesis often investigated in empirical studies is the positive effect 
that a firm’s voluntary emission reductions would generate in the value of its 
stock market. Theoretical analyses which support this supposition are generally 
lacking. In particular, it is not fully understood if the (weak) responses noticed 
in capital markets are a possible cause of firms’ undertaking VAs, or if these 
responses are the effect of higher profit prospects determined by the adoption 
of a VA.  
In the framework of this paper, if we consider the input price reduction as 
a cause and not as an effect, the possible impact of the VA on the stock market 
value could be interpreted as a cost reduction. In addition, in accordance with 
the empirical literature, these effects should be analysed as firm-specific ones. 
To move to a ‘structural’ interpretation, one then needs some hypotheses on 
what actually drives investors’ decisions. Some hypotheses which are consistent 
with the view of positive returns in the stock market as a cause of voluntary 
over-compliance are as follows (Cf. Lyon and Maxwell, 2001): 
- investors have green preferences, i.e., ceteris paribus, they reward 
environmental effort and disregard firms with bad environmental 
performances;  
- investors link pollution to inefficient production. 
Admittedly, ‘green funds’ represent a very small segment in equity 
markets, and the relation between pollution and economic inefficiency is not yet 
supported by strong empirical evidence. Nonetheless, other explanations (e.g. 
those which explain the reaction of capital markets to VAs as related to a 
reduced probability of incurring in sanctions or command and control 
interventions) are again mixing causes with effects. 
In principle, an input saving may also arise from a reduction of labour 
costs. For example, the adoption of environmental friendly technologies could 
reduce the ‘premium’ which employers must pay to convince their employees to 
work in firms with a bad environmental performance, in particular if the 
environmental damage is likely to affect health conditions within and nearby the 
factories where workers and their households work and live. To the best of our 
knowledge, the plausibility and the size of this hypothesis has not yet been 
empirically studied. 
The association made above between pollution and inefficiency leads to 
cases where cost saving  arises  not from a reduction in the cost of inputs, but 
from a reduction in the quantities employed in production. Cost cutting is 
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usually recognised as the main explanation for the voluntary adoption of VAs in 
which the firms commit to adopt effective environmental management systems 
(Hillary et al., 1998). However,  existing economic literature lacks convincing 
explanations as to why cleaning up activities may constitute a ‘free lunch’ and is 
often uncomfortable with the occurrence of these conditions. For example, 
Lyon and Maxwell (2001) state that, in the case of “…’win/win’ solutions in which 
the adoption of environmentally-friendly technology lowers cost, economic analysis is not needed 
to conclude that these actions are desirable, nor are subsidies required to induce adoption”.  
This view is probably motivated by the argument that ‘win-win’ solutions 
are not consistent with traditional assumptions about perfect rationality. 
However, the saving input motive may not be trivial in the presence of 
information constraints. In particular, VAs may represent a rational cost efficient way 
to collect and re-distribute information in industries where information about cleaner 
technologies is imperfectly or asymmetrically distributed. Therefore, information 
circulated through a public voluntary scheme or a well established self-
regulation practice (e.g. ISO 14001) could be ‘cheaper’ because of its 
‘certification’ which reduces uncertainty.  
In a multi-firm framework, a rational explanation for VA adoption is that 
polluters can share their incomplete information in order to achieve better 
environmental performances. The idea of ‘information sharing’ between firms 
as a base for the adoption of VAs is formally developed by Glachant (1999) and 
Cavaliere and Frontoso Silvestri (2000). From a normative viewpoint, this action 
is considered to be cost efficient vis à vis other policy instruments (Glachant, 
1999) in the case of ‘shared uncertainty’, and detrimental in the case of 
asymmetric information. Market structure is also crucial for determining if cost 
savings outweigh the possible loss of consumer surplus (see Cavaliere and 
Frontoso Silvestri, 2000). 
4.3. VAs and competition advantages 
VAs are sometimes accused of having negative effects on competition. 
Worries about these effects have arisen first of all because, by signing an 
agreement, firms have the opportunity to adopt cooperative rules that implicitly 
affect market prices and quantities. But explicit effects of VAs on market 
concentration can also be identified. Namely, a VA can be a barrier to entry for 
new firms that are not necessarily allowed to share the benefits of the VAs (e.g. 
in terms of reputation effects). Alternatively, a VA adopted by a subset of firms 
modifies the distribution of production costs across firms in the industry, thus 
also modifying industry concentration.  
Let us consider two cases in which a VA may increase a firm’s profits 
through its effects on competition, i.e. a) by boosting the possibility of collusive 
behaviour; b) by affecting the competitiveness of the other firms in the industry. In both 
cases, an upward shift of the supply curve will occur, with higher equilibrium 
prices, reduced output, and possible losses in consumer surplus.  
4.3.1. VAs and collusion strategies 
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The setting up of a VA may directly enhance collusive behaviour simply 
because it is usually accompanied by a series of organisational tools (collection 
of information, coordination and monitoring of production decisions), all of 
which favour the implementation of price or quantity fixing. It may also do so 
indirectly, through its role in the implicit collusive strategies which firms may 
undertake.  
To analyse this latter case, a common tool is the theory of repeated games. 
Tacit collusive equilibria are shown to occur by assuming that a firm follows 
some ‘trigger strategies’ following ‘defection’ by its competitors. The simplest 
trigger strategy states that the firm will maintain the monopoly price at time t if 
other firms did the same in the previous periods, whilst it will fix the price at the 
marginal cost from period t to infinity if competitors previously decreased the 
price.  
With this elementary framework, Brau and Carraro (1999) show, on the 
one hand, that a credible mandatory threat makes collusion among firms more 
difficult; on the other hand, that the adoption of a VA aimed at completely pre-
empting or lessening a regulatory threat reinforces collusive strategies among 
firms.33 Intuitively, the presence of a regulatory threat acts as an additional 
discount factor on future gains, while leaving unaffected the possibility of ‘one 
shot’ monopoly gains with anti-collusive behaviour. The expected return 
brought by collusion therefore becomes smaller. Conversely, by pre-empting 
the regulatory intervention, future profits become less uncertain for firms, 
which is equivalent to assigning a smaller discount rate to expected profits.  
It appears quite clear that the establishment of collusive behaviour in 
relation to the adoption of a VA would lead to the paradoxical result of cost 
reductions inducing higher prices and lower output at the equilibrium. The 
policy conclusion is therefore that a regulator should closely monitor the market 
behaviour of signatory firms. 
4.3.2. Shaping the competitiveness of the other firms in the industry through a VA 
Some VAs may actually represent a real cost for a firm, net of any 
reduction in the probability of incurring in costlier regulatory regimes or 
accessing to financial or technical incentives. Then why does a firm sign a VA in 
this case? An easy justification can be found if the cost increase is associated 
with an upward shift in the market demand function, due to the effects of green 
consumerism. This can easily be shown by using the results on environmental 
taxation in oligopolistic markets contained in Carraro and Soubeyran (1996). 
They show that some firms may increase their profits when costs increase, in 
particular if they have a low market share.  
Without demand shifts, one can instead refer to a stream of literature 
which has analysed the possibilities of profit increases due to higher taxation in 
                                                 
33 The authors also show that, with respect to the baseline case, the existence of a regulatory threat 
makes collusion among firms more difficult. 
 28
oligopolies where market demand has a peculiar configuration, such as an 
isoelastic functional form.34  
In order to understand why firms may undertake a costly action, we can 
consider the case in which a VA constitutes a barrier aimed at deterring entry or 
forcing exit of some firms in the industry. In particular, it may be of interest to 
assess to what extent VAs can be used: a) as a strategic barrier to entry by incumbent 
firms; b) to influence the behaviour of entrant firms, once entry is ineluctable or even desirable. 
Let us consider first the case of a VA which induces demand effects but 
does not deter entry. With Cournot competition (Garvie’s model, 1999), the 
implementation of a VA represents a ‘fat cat strategy’. A single company has an 
incentive to adopt a VA even if it increases the demand for the other firm. In a 
less intuitive example, Luts et al. (2000) show that the same strategy can also be 
undertaken by a high quality firm in the case of environmental quality 
differentiation. The key to this result is the existence of a public good benefit (a 
regulatory gain or a total demand effect) in addition to the private benefit of 
product differentiation models (a specific demand increase due to consumers’ 
green preferences).  
Conversely, when entry is deterred, the use of VAs aimed at capturing the 
willingness to pay due to green consumerism represents a ‘Top Dog’ behaviour, 
which satisfies the most sensitive preferences (usually from the richest 
consumers) with a large environmental investment, while leaving the dirtier and 
less profitable production to the entrant firm. Product differentiation could also 
allow for strategic barrier to entry of the ‘brand proliferation’ type, which will 
occur when the same company tries to fill-in the market by occupying the 
largest possible number of market niches. In the case of VAs, we can think of a 
firm or industry association which, by means of a VA, enters the market with a 
new ‘clean’ product while continuing to produce an old (and ‘dirty’) similar 
good. By doing so, the incumbent firm or cartel is deterring entry because it is 
limiting the maximum distance in the space of environmental characteristics 
that the entrant could obtain.  
In the case of VAs primarily involving strategic supply shifts, the most 
interesting case is the one of “induced regulation”. Again, it is possible to 
distinguish between cases of accommodated and deterred entry. An example of 
the first case is offered by Lutz et al. (2000). As we saw in section 4.2, in their 
model the regulator operates in a complete information framework and is 
primarily interested in total emission reductions. Strategic over-compliance by a 
high quality firm aims to lessen the equilibrium minimum standard set by the 
regulator, while increasing competitors’ profits vis à vis a situation in which no 
voluntary action is undertaken. The VA makes the adopting firm ‘soft’, since 
the regulatory gains are seen as non-excludable. A similar situation (with 
stronger advantages for free-riders) can be found in the model by Dawson and 
Segerson (2000).  
                                                 
34 For the relationship between changes of the industry cost structure and industry concentration see 
Dung (1993).  
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Conversely, deterred entry will lead to a ‘Top Dog’ strategy whenever the 
effects of the VA are appropriable in a way which makes the firm “tough”. An 
example is the case where additional voluntary abatement is reached through 
large R&D investments or by building a new large plant. This may create a 
barrier to entry in terms of economies of scale or of absolute cost advantages, if 
the investment is such that it determines a high minimum efficient scale.  
Another possible case is when, through voluntary over-compliance, firms 
try to induce future stronger regulation which prevents entry of new firms 
(Barrett, 1991; Salop and Scheffman, 1983). This situation can turn out to be 
particularly relevant in the case of asymmetric information between public and 
private agents. With respect to VAs, this analysis is developed in depth by 
Denicolò (2000), who shows how a VA can become the appropriate tool by 
means of which the firm with the lowest abatement costs reveals its own ‘type’ 
and shows itself willing comply with a stricter regulation (with which its 
competitors cannot comply). In all these cases, the incumbent firm is ‘tough’, 
because the regulation, or even the threat of it, reduces the entrant’s expected 
profits. 
To Sum up, let us first note that the non-compulsory nature of VAs is 
likely to facilitate their strategic use as a barrier to entry. Secondly, when either a 
VA deters the entry of new firms in the industry or when it makes the activity 
of new firms less profitable, industry concentration is likely to increase. 
Therefore, the adoption of VAs may reduce competition, and thus induce 
economic costs that partly offset the environmental benefits produced by the 
firms’ voluntary emission abatement. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has proposed an overview of the existing economic literature 
on voluntary approaches to environmental protection. The focus of this survey 
is on the incentives for firms to sign a VA. These incentives have been grouped 
into two main categories, strictly related to demand and supply effects. This 
classification makes it easier to link the pros and cons of VAs as an 
environmental policy tool to some basic economic incentives. 
The conclusions derived from the theoretical literature surveyed partly 
support the scepticism which has accompanied the adoption of VAs in 
environmental policy. In particular, the presence of regulatory capture, 
substantial weakening of regulatory threats, free-riding incentives, distortions on 
competition, are some of the main reasons that limit the environmental 
effectiveness of VAs.  
However, this survey has also shown how a mix of policy tools, which 
includes VAs, can be appropriate in dealing with many environmental problems. 
For example, the introduction of minimum mandatory requirements is usually 
welfare improving in models with whether supply side or demand side 
participation incentives. 
In addition, we have seen that VAs may become more environmentally 
effective thanks to the concentrated structure of the industry. It may indeed be 
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easier to undertake a VA, and design the features of the VA to achieve the 
desired emission reduction. Negotiations among a small number of parties may 
facilitate mutual understanding and trust. The high visibility of the VA may 
benefit emission-abating companies by increasing their market demand. 
Minimum abatement efforts may be more easily imposed. Technological 
cooperation and joint R&D investments can probably be implemented. Large 
companies may find it convenient to couple a VA - where an emission target is 
set - with an internal emission trading scheme designed to minimise abatement 
costs. 
In this context, a conflict between environmental policy and competition 
policy may occur. The two policies may have conflicting objectives if the 
adoption of a VA and the consequent environmental benefits are associated 
with reduced competition within the industry. In other words, if a VA is the 
optimal environmental policy tool to deal with a given environmental problem, 
an environmental regulator may prefer a concentrated industry structure in 
which the VA can more easily be implemented and is likely to be more 
effective. But a competition authority may not accept a trade-off of the 
environmental benefits of the VA with the economic costs determined possibly 
by a more concentrated industry. Hence, the many benefits that can be achieved 
from the adoption of VAs should be carefully compared with their potential 
costs in terms of reduced competition.  
The solution to this trade-off is consistent with the well known nature of 
solutions to other economic trade-off, and lies in the adoption of two 
instruments to achieve two objectives. For example, a regulator could intervene 
with a second policy tool (whether an environmental subsidy for entrant firms 
or sanctions on collusive behaviour). 
As another example, consider the case in which the effectiveness of an 
industry-wide VA is weakened by the presence of free-riding. The regulator can 
however design a policy mix which offsets the free-riding incentives and designs 
the VA in order to enhance its environmental and economic effectiveness. Here 
are some suggestions derived from Brau and Carraro (2004): 
- The expected benefits of the VA (in terms of regulatory pre-emption, 
technological co-operation, etc.) should go mainly to the firms which sign 
the VA. Free-riders should, at least partly, be excluded from these benefits 
(e.g. they are taxed whereas signatories are not). 
- A minimum participation constraint should be introduced for the VA to 
be operational, i.e. for firms to enjoy its expected benefits (e.g. direct 
regulation or taxation is not introduced only if a sufficient number of 
firms sign the VA). 
- A minimum abatement level should be introduced to avoid “cosmetic” 
emission abatements, but also to offset the negative effects on production 
and profits of a non-cooperative behaviour on abatement levels.  
- If the environmental objective is mostly relevant, the regulator should also 
impose open access to the VA in order to exclude an anti-competitive, 
discriminatory use of the VA by firms. 
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All these policy recommendations constitute a well-defined policy mix that 
enables the regulator to achieve the environmental benefits that a VA can 
provide without incurring in VA related economic costs. 
Therefore, the main lessons derived from this survey can be phrased as 
follows. VAs sometimes are a more feasible policy than usual economic 
instruments. In this cases, a careful understanding of the economic incentives 
beneath that induce a firm to adopt a given VA is crucial in order to identify 
and design those policy mixes that make the VA both environmentally effective 
and economically efficient. 
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Figure 1: Summary of demand and supply effects 
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Figure 2: The effects of an increase of environmental quality in 
case of “green consumerism” in an oligopolistic market 
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Figure 3:  VAs’ supply effects 
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